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Baldacci: Protecting Gay and Lesbian Families From Eviction From Their Home

COLLECTION OF ESSAYS
PROTECTING GAY AND LESBIAN FAMILIES
FROM EVICTION FROM THEIR HOMES:
THE QUEST FOR EQUALITY FOR GAY
AND LESBIAN FAMILIES IN
BRASCHI V. STAHL ASSOCIATES
Paris R. Baldaccit
Almost twenty years ago, in Braschi v. Stahl Associates,1 New York
State's Court of Appeals extended family eviction protections to gay
and lesbian families in terms that many of us involved in that case 2 did
not expect,3 i.e., in glowing, almost effusive language, finding that gay,
t Clinical Professor of Law and Supervising Attorney, Benjamin N. Cardozo
School of Law, Cardozo Bet Tzedek Legal Services Clinic. Prof. Baldacci specializes
in landlord-tenant and housing representation, and co-teaches a seminar on Social
Welfare Litigation. He has also taught Sexual Orientation and the Law. He lectures
and writes extensively on the tenancy succession rights of gay, lesbian and other functional families. He represented defendant-intervenors in Rent Stabilization Ass'n v.
Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626 (N.Y. 1993) (upholding tenancy succession regulations that
codified Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989)).
1. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54.
2. The Author was honored, as a first-year attorney, to be one of the co-authors
of the amicus brief of the Legal Aid Society in the Braschi case. Brief Amicus Curiae
of the Legal Aid Society of New York City, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d
49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 2194/87).
3. The Court's sweeping, positive description of gay and lesbian families was particularly unexpected since Braschi was decided only three years after the Supreme
Court's infamous decision, Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986), in which that
Court found that "[n]o connection between family, marriage, or procreation on the
one hand and homosexual activity on the other has been demonstrated .... " id. at
191, and, indeed, rejected as "facetious" any claim that gay/lesbian relationships fell
within this country's long history of protecting the privacy of its citizens' personal
choices and relationships. Id. at 194; see Note. Inching Down the Aisle: Differing
Paths Toward the Legalization of Same-Sex Marriagein the United States and Europe,
116 HARV. L. REV.2004, 2025 (2003) ("[C]ourts' [including the Braschi Court's] widespread adoption of functionalism in many cases involving same-sex unions is striking
in that it has occurred in the shadow of the Supreme Court's disapproval of homosexuality in Hardwick."). It would take the Supreme Court fourteen years after the
Braschi decision to reject the holding, language and tone of Bowers regarding gay and
lesbian relationships and families. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003) (reversing
Bowers because "[p]ersons in a homosexual relationship may seek autonomy for
these purposes [i.e., to make intimate and personal choices], just as heterosexual perIts continuance as
sons do. The decision in Bowers would deny them this right ....
precedent demeans the lives of homosexual persons." Id. at 574-75); see Paris R.
Baldacci, Lawrence and Garner:The Love (or at Least Sexual Attraction) That Finally
Dared Speak Its Name, 10 CARDOZO WOMEN'S L.J. 289 (2004) (comparing the holdings in Bowers and Lawrence); Laurence H. Tribe, Essay, Lawrence v. Texas: The
"FundamentalRight" That Dare Not Speak Its Name, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1893 (2004)
619
(same).
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lesbian, and other functional families or families of choice 4 were equal
to and in some instances more family-like5 than the married and biological heterosexual families that were already protected under the
family anti-eviction regulations at issue in that case.6 Accordingly, the
Court held that gay and lesbian families (and other functional families) should also be protected from eviction from their rent-regulated
family homes on the death or departure of the tenant of record. In
reaching that conclusion the court found:
[T]he term family should not be rigidly restricted to those people
who have formalized their relationship by obtaining, for instance, a
marriage certificate or an adoption order. The intended protection
of sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or
genetic history, but should find its foundation in the reality of family
life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and certainly
equally valid, view of family life includes two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional
and financial commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with our society's traditional concept of "family" and
with the expectations of individuals in those relationships.7
The Court reasoned that lower courts could, as they had in the past,
look to certain "factors" to determine whether future cases involved
"families" that should be protected from eviction. The factors articulated by the Court are: "exclusivity and longevity of the relationship,
the level of emotional and financial commitment, the manner in which
the parties hold themselves out to society, and the reliance placed
upon one another for daily family services." 8 However, the Court
cautioned that although "[t]hese factors are most helpful,. . . it should
be emphasized that the presence or absence of one or more of them is
not dispositive since it is the totality of the relationship as evidenced
by the dedication, caring, and self-sacrifice of the parties which
4. The Author uses the terms "functional families" and "families of choice" inter-

changeably in this essay. See generally KATH
ANS, GAYS, KINSHIP

(1991);

PETER

M.

WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE: LESBINARDI, GAY MEN'S FRIENDSHIPS: INVINCIBLE

59-73 (1999); Craig W. Christensen, Legal Ordering of Family Values:
The Case of Gay and Lesbian Families, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1299 (1997); see also
Paris R. Baldacci, Pushingthe Law to Encompass the Reality of Our Families:Protecting Lesbian and Gay Families from Eviction from Their Homes-Braschi'sFunctional
Definition of "Family" and Beyond, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 973, 975 n.6, 979 n.30
(1994) (and works cited there). A review of the arguments in support of and against
use of a functional approach is beyond the scope of this essay. Professor Christensen's article summarizes much of the literature and arguments. See supra; see also
Martha Minow, Redefining Families: Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV.
268, 276-80 (1991) (describing the limits of a functional approach); Baldacci, supra, at
988-95 (comparing homosexual and heterosexual "families" using Braschi's functional definition of "family").
5. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54.
6. N.Y. Comp. CODES R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d) (Westlaw through Aug. 31,
COMMUNITIES

2006).
7. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54.
8. Id. at 55.
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should, in the final analysis, control."9 Finally, the Court noted that
"Appellant's situation provides an example of how the rule should be
applied."'" It then went on to summarize the facts of Braschi and
Blanchard's relationship, noting that they had been "life partners for
more than ten years"; "regarded one another, and were regarded by
friends and family, as spouses"; held themselves out as spouses and
family to their biological families and visited them; formalized their
relationship, e.g., by holding joint bank accounts and credit cards; and
that Blanchard had designated Braschi as his attorney-in-fact and
health care proxy, and as the primary legatee and executor of his
estate.1
9. Id.
10. Id. (emphasis added).
11. Id. The Court made no reference to the fact that Blanchard had died of AIDS
and that Braschi had cared for him during his final illness. This omission is surprising
since the common wisdom has been that the Braschi Court was influenced in large
part if not primarily by concerns about the dislocation of persons living with AIDS
from their family homes on the death of their partners from AIDS. See, e.g., GEORGE
CHAUNCEY, WHY MARRIAGE? THE HISTORY SHAPING TODAY'S DEBATE OVER GAY

EQUALITY 102-103 (2004) ("Braschi was only one of many unmarried partners [of

persons who died from AIDS] threatened with eviction. Many of those partners were
ill themselves, at a time when homelessness and discrimination were growing
problems for people with AIDS. In a landmark decision that all sides believed was
deeply influenced by... 'the painful facts of AIDS,' the New York Court of Appeals
ruled that Braschi should be considered a family member for purpose of the renter's
successionsrights."); Lisa M. Farabee, Comment, Marriage, Equal Protection, and
New Judicial Federalism:A View from the States, 14 YALE L. & POL'Y REV. 237, 242
(1996) ("The Braschi decision must be interpreted within the context of the AIDS
epidemic to understand the court's analysis and final result."). However, although
Braschi's lawyers from the American Civil Liberties Union ("ACLU") urged that "no
better indicia of the nature of the couple's relationship exists than the love and commitment appellant showed for Blanchard during his illness," Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, pp. 7-8, they did not at any time indicate that the illness was in fact AIDS. See
Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant at 7-8, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y.
1989) (No. 02194-87). "At Mr. Braschi's request, the papers filed with the Court [by
his ACLU lawyers] are silent about the nature of his partner's illness .... David L.
Chambers, Tales of Two Cities: AIDS and the Legal Recognition of Domestic Partnerships in San Francisco and New York, 2 LAW & SEXUALITY 181, 195 (1991). Nevertheless, Chambers claims that "anyone reading the record would have inferred that
his partner had died of AIDS." Id.; see also Farabee, supra, at 242 n.25; Joseph S.
Arsenault, Comment, "Family" But Not "Parent": Same-Sex Coupling Jurisprudence
of the New York Court of Appeals, 58 ALB. L. REV. 813, 830 n.97 (1995) (citing Victoria Slind-Flor, At the Limits: Major AIDS Cases Have Been Teaching Old Law New
Tricks, NAT'L L.J., Aug. 27, 1990, at 1, 31, quoting attorney Peter Fowler, stating that
although "'the court [in Braschi] does not address the issue of AIDS in any shape or
manner.., you don't need a two-by-four to beat on the side of someone's head to
convince them this [Braschi] is an AIDS case."'). In any event, it should be noted
that all references to AIDS in the record occur only in amici briefs and the Court
itself makes no reference to AIDS in its decision. This omission is in stark contrast to
the Court's later decision upholding the promulgation of regulations that codified
Braschi in Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626 (N.Y. 1993). In that
case the Court summarized the "grounds" for the regulatory agency's purpose in
promulgating the regulations as follows: "chronic low rental vacancy rate for affordable units, increasing homelessness and poverty, the AIDS epidemic and the rise in
621
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In relatively quick succession, the Braschi decision led to further
recognitions of and protections for gay and lesbian families in New
York and beyond:' 2 regulatory codification of the Braschi decision ex-

tended eviction protection to over one million rent-stabilized apart-

ments, compared to rent-control's 50,000 apartments; 13 regulatory

codification extending eviction protection to thousands of other city-

and-state-regulated housing; 4 requiring equal treatment of gay and
lesbian families in private housing;"5 authorizing second-parent adoption;16 requiring equal treatment of gay and lesbian couples in university (marital) housing. 7 Indeed, the significance of Braschi has been

recognized by courts outside of the United States.

8

nontraditional families (including same-sex couples...)." Higgins, 630 N.E.2d at 630
(emphasis added). The Higgins Court also quoted the agency as explaining that the
regulations were "intended to clarify a non-traditional family member's right to remain in his or her home, particularlyat a time when a significantpercentage of those
households may be vulnerable to the AIDS epidemic." Id. (emphasis added). Accordingly, although the Braschi Court's awareness of the AIDS crisis and its impact on
what it calls "non-traditional families" cannot be gainsaid, the extent of the impact of
the AIDS crisis on the Braschi Court's decision remains speculative.
12. See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 4, at 982-95 (evaluating application of Braschi
indicia by courts in first five years after Braschi decision); PARIS R. BALDACCI, LITIGATING SUCCESSION RIGHTS CASES IN NEW YORK CITY AND STATE (2007) (analyzing all reported Braschi succession cases from 1989 to date; updated annually;
available from author). The significance of the Braschi decision has been noted by
many commentators. See, Baldacci, supra note 4, at 975 & n.8; Paula L. Ettelbrick,
Wedlock Alert: A Comment on Lesbian and Gay Family Recognition, 5 J.L. & POL'Y
107, 136 (1996); Nancy Levit, A Different Kind of Sameness: Beyond Formal Equality
and Antisubordination Strategies in Gay Legal Theory, 61 OHIO ST. L.J. 867, 907-08
(2000). But see Mary F. Gardner, Note, Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co.: Much Ado
About Nothing?, 35 VILL. L. REV. 361, 381 (1990) ("Although Braschi has been hailed
as a significant legal victory for same-sex couples, this Note suggests that the case is
likely to have limited and unpredictable precedential effect, both in New York courts
and nationally.").
13. Baldacci, supra note 4, at 975; BALDACCI, supra note 12, at 4-14 (describing
regulatory codification and extension of Braschi).
14. Baldacci, supra note 4, at 975 n.7 (describing extension of Braschi to other
New York City-and State-regulated housing); BALDACCI, supra note 12, at 66-82
(same, with analysis of all reported succession cases under those regulations).
15. Baldacci, supra note 4, at 975 n.7 (describing extension of Braschi to private
rental and cooperative housing by the New York City Human Rights Commission).
16. In the Matter of Jacob and Dana, 636 N.E.2d 715 (N.Y. 1995).
17. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099 (N.Y. 2001).
18. See Fitzpatrick v. Sterling Hous. Assoc. Ltd., 3 W.L.R. 1113 (1999) (Eng.) (extending succession to some tenancies for same-sex partners, citing approvingly to
Braschi and other cases "to show the attitudes being adopted in other jurisdictions");
National Coalition for Gay and Lesbian Equality and Others v. Minister of Home
Affairs, Case CCT 10/99, 48 (1999) (S. Aft.) (extending immigration protections to
same-sex partners, citing to Braschi and other cases as "giv[ing] expression to norms
and values in other open and democratic societies based on human dignity, equality
and freedom which, in my view, give clear expression to the growing concern for,
understanding of, and sensitivity towards human diversity in general and to gays and
lesbians and their relationships in particular. This is an important source from which
to illuminate our understanding of the Constitution and the promotion of its inform622
ing norms").
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As indicated above, much of the Author's professional life has been
involved in writing about and litigating Braschi-relatedmatters. However, the theme of this Conference-how law and its practitioners affect issues of freedom, equality, and justice-has given the Author the
opportunity to begin to address questions raised when the Author first
watched the tape of the Braschi oral argument and then read the
ACLU briefs, but which the Author has not had the opportunity to
address since then. Those questions are: 1) What role did Braschi's
lawyers play in the Court's formulation of a functional definition of
family? 2) Was the Braschi Court fearlessly entering a brave new
world of gay and lesbian equality, leading the legal system into a recognition of same-sex families, or was it playing catch-up, i.e., recognizing what had already become the social and cultural reality of
functional families-gay, lesbian, and other? The Author's presentation at the conference on these questions, which is somewhat further
developed here, was an attempt to begin to sketch the contours of
answers to those questions.1 9
I.

WHAT CONTRIBUTION DID BRASCHI'S LAWYERS MAKE TO THE
BRASCHI COURT'S ARTICULATION OF A FUNCTIONAL
DEFINITION OF FAMILY?

The first question the Author wants to address is the relationship of
the litigation choices-theory of the case, legal strategy, inter-play of
statutory and constitutional claims, etc.-adopted by Braschi's lawyers to the contours and content of the Braschi Court's functional definition of "family." As an entry point into that inquiry, the Author
has reviewed once again the tape of the oral argument in Braschi and
the briefs submitted by Braschi's lawyers.2" What follows is a summary with quotations of what the Author takes to be key and representative moments in the oral argument that will provide a basis for
the inquiry that follows.
19. Accordingly, this essay is a preliminary exploration and its conclusions should
be read in that light. Also, I do not seek to place these conclusions in the context of
all of the literature written regarding the Braschi decision, use of a functional definition of family, dynamic statutory interpretation, nor the relationship of the Braschi
decision to the same-sex marriage debate.
20. There is no official transcript of that argument. The summary and quotations
included here are my own transcription of the video tape of that argument. It should
be noted further that I do not give a complete transcript here, but rather selected
quotations which I believe to be representative of the exchange between the Court
and Braschi's attorney. His main argument lasted about 22 minutes; his rebuttal,
about four minutes. In addition, references to the briefs submitted by Braschi shall be
as follows: Brief of Plaintiff Appellant, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49
(N.Y. 1989) (No. 02194-87) [hereinafter Braschi Brief]; Reply Brief of Plaintiff-Appellant, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 02194-87) [hereinafter Braschi Reply Brief].
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The Oral Argument

Braschi's lawyer, William Rubenstein, clearly set forth his theory of
the case in his opening sentence: "This case concerns whether a functional family member must be protected from eviction from a rent
controlled apartment which is his family home in the same manner
that other family members are protected." However, only about one
minute into the argument, Judge Hancock, who would be one of the
two dissenters in Braschi, queried:
I would just like to ask one preliminary question. You use the term
"functional equivalent of a family" and that was the terminology I
think used in [our zoning cases]. So a holding in your favor would
really embrace or incorporate that [zoning] type of definition into
the definition of family in the statute.
Rubenstein barely gets to respond "yes" when Judge Hancock interjects, "It's that broad?" Rubenstein again tries to respond, but is
again interrupted by Judge Hancock: "Because I believe [those cases]
concerned families as people living together, keeping house together,
using the same kitchen, that sort of thing. That's the interpretation
you're urging?" Rubenstein attempts a response: "Well, what we're
urging is that the standard this Court articulated in the [zoning] line of
cases, the functional and factual equivalent standard be used here, but
you would have to interpret that standard with respect to the purposes
of rent control."
Hancock interrupts again, clearly not satisfied with Rubenstein's response: "I realize that. I just want to... I assume you have a statutory
construction question here first, anyway." Rubenstein: "That's correct." Judge Hancock: "And your position on the meaning of the
term 'family' in the statute, what does 'family' mean? Does it extend
to as broad a meaning as the courts have given it in [the zoning
cases]?"
Rubenstein attempts to meet Judge Hancock's "is it that broad"
concern:
Again, we believe that the standard is the functional and factual
equivalent standard articulated in that line of cases. The result
would depend on a case by case analysis and the point is that you
would interpret the standard in light of the purposes of rent control,
so the interpretation might be different in a specific case than it
would be in a zoning case. You would have to look at the purposes
of rent control and whether that group functions as a family for
those purposes.
Judge Hancock poses the definitional question again: "Let me ask
the question in one other way: A finding for your client would mean
that people living together in that sense that people lived together in
the [zoning cases] would come within the meaning of the term 'family'?" Rubenstein replies:
624
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Again, your honor, the analysis that you would have to do would be
whether the family, whether the group [as in a zoning case] functioned as a family for purposes of rent control. The purpose of rent
control here that we are talking about ...protects tenants when
they've made the apartment their family home. So you would have
to look at a group like the [zoning cases] group that was protected
and say, "Is this their family home?" In other words, "Are they a
family for the purposes of rent control?" So, the standard is the
same but it's conceivable that a group ... might be protected in a
zoning context, but not necessarily protected if they didn't make
this their family home in a rent control context.
At that point, about five minutes into the 22-minute argument, Judge
Kaye intervenes with essentially the same definitional question: "Mr.
Rubenstein, precisely how do you define family and where do you
find that definition?" Rubenstein begins to respond by returning to
his zoning case argument: "Again your honor, we find the definition in
your line of cases in the zoning context, the functional and factual ....
" However, Judge Kaye interrupts him in mid-sentence: "But
we should look for the rent control context, as you suggest." Rubenstein agrees, "That's right."
He then attempts to argue that other housing statutory enactments
also use a functional definition of family, but Judge Simons, who
would author the dissent in Braschi, retorts, "What about the rentstabilization law?" which limits the definition of family to those related by blood or by law. After a brief exchange regarding the relevance of the rent-stabilization definition of family to this rent-control
case, Judge Bellacosa interjects:
Let me interrupt at that point. If we accept your premise of functional family being the interpretation and definition given to the
rent control and rent and tenant protection situation, does that
transfer the control or the breadth or the sweep or the definition to
the tenants, so that if two tenants wanted to come together-not in
the relationship that is present in this case, I'm thinking of the rule
of law that will come from this case and from your definition-if
they come together of a mind to fulfill your functional family test,
do they, by their coming together get the benefit of the tenant protection eviction under this regulation? ...I'm concerned about the
breadth of the interpretation and how courts and administrative
agencies can determine it within some definition that is equal in its
application to all.
Rubenstein acknowledges that concern, but argues that there will be
judicial hearings "with regards to this functional and factual
equivalent standard." But Judge Bellacosa quickly interrupts: "What
do you test it against, though. In those hearings, does he [the judge]
simply take the two words 'functional family,' and if the rule is, 'functional family' means anybody who wants to be protected under the
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eviction protections, is that it, is it as broad as that?" Rubenstein
responds:
No. And my second point is that the standard we're asking to be
employed, the functional and factual equivalent standard, a standard that this Court has articulated in the zoning cases and it has
worked in the zoning context. Now, the standard itself would be
functional and factual equivalent, but you could think of a number
of indicia that the person claiming the protection would have to
come forward and prove those indicia, would have to prove that
they were a functional and factual equivalent family. And they
would do so by showing certain things. For example, that they held
themselves out to be a family; that they assumed the responsibilities
for one another. For example that their relationship had some permanence to it ....

Now, at about ten minutes into the argument, Judge Hancock again
poses his initial definitional question: "Let's assume the family unit in
[one of the zoning cases], four elderly ladies living together, keeping
house together, eating together, etc., let's assume that one was a tenant and she died. Would her rights under rent control be transferred
to the survivors?" Rubenstein replies: "Your honor, it would depend
on whether that group had the functional and factual equivalent of a
family." Judge Hancock, noting they were deemed to be a functional
family in the zoning case, inquires again on what basis Rubenstein
could argue that they might not be entitled to eviction protection as a
functional family:
Well, I guess several members of the Court have asked the same
thing. We're asking what is the definition and what would the result
be under what you say the definition of family is here in this statute.
We're talking about a statute and its application. How would you
answer my question under the statute?
Rubenstein responds by noting that the issue to be determined would
be if the group is a family and not mere roommates. However, Judge
Hancock asks, almost incredulously: "How would anyone know what
the statute meant if that were the answer we were to give?" Rubenstein argues that in the zoning and other contexts, a functional definition has been recognized as providing a "judicially ascertainable
standard" and that the indicia mentioned earlier could be used. However, Judge Bellacosa interrupts:
Ah, but there's the rub. You were talking about those [indicia]
before. You say we would look at those indicia. What you're really
asking as an advocate, and I understand that, is for us to erect, enact
those indicia as part of the definition of family. Isn't that what is
really necessary in order for the rule of law to have any sense in
terms of its application once this case is decided, however it's de-

cided? Is that our role?
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Rubenstein pauses, not answering yes or no to this inquiry; he then
responds:
Your honor, it's your role to interpret what's meant by the phrase
here. The legislature did not give you much guidance; they said
"family member." In other contexts where they've given more guidance and specifically defined "family member," and we point to
about a dozen different statutes where they've done that, where
they spelled out what they mean by "family member," they said this
kind of relationship would be a family relationship.
Judge Bellacosa interrupts again:
But let me press you. Do you agree that we would have to, in order
to decide the case properly and come out with a rule of law that
could help us decide it properly, that we would have to recite what
those indicia or criteria are in terms of the effectuation of a functional family in order to distinguish, for example, the roommate
situation ...

?

Almost 15 minutes into his 22-minute argument, Rubenstein finally
responds more directly to the definitional question that had been
posed by three judges:
I understand your question. In the zoning context, what you did
was you gave the lower courts guidance by saying "functional and
factual equivalent" and you talked about the facts in those cases to
give them some guidance in doing that. You could take that approach here because I think the facts in this case are very instructive, the facts in this case are very compelling. This couple lived
together and they shared their lives together for quite a long time
and I think a recitation of the facts here would help lower courts
understand what you meant by family in that sense.... You could

also look to the kinds of phrases we're talking about-held themselves out to be a family; took up the responsibilities for one another; had a degree of permanence-these are ideas about family
that we have.
Rubenstein then moves onto his constitutional argument for the last
four minutes, but even there he is interrupted by Judge Kaye regarding the definitional question: "Mr. Rubenstein, I share the concern
that my colleagues have expressed, which is to find some definition,
[some] understanding of your concept of family. So long as the definition is one of blood and law, there is some objective criterion." Rubenstein repeats his argument regarding the functional standard's
being an "ascertainable judicial standard."
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Comments on the Oral Argument

This review of the Braschi oral argument suggests a few comments.
First, besides Braschi's lawyer's"' obvious avoidance of the court's repeated question: "What do you mean by family?" it is clear that his
central theory of the case and litigation strategy was to urge the Court
to adopt what one can call a fairly abstract, general, tautological defi-

nition of "family" borrowed primarily from the Court's zoning cases.22

Those cases defined "family" broadly as any unitary group living together.2 3 Arguing from those cases, Braschi's lawyers urged that
"family" should be understood to be any grouping of people that
meets the functional and factual equivalent of family standard, which

should be interpreted in the context of housing, i.e., protecting them
from dislocation from their family home on the death of the tenant of
record, and applied on a case-by-case basis.
However, as Judge Hancock (who would be one of the two dissenters in Braschi) retorted: "Is it that broad?" "How would anyone

know what the statute meant if that were the answer we were to
give?" More forcefully, even the plurality summarily rejected in a
footnote this zoning-based functional-family analysis as having "absolutely no bearing on the scope of non-eviction protections provide by"
the rent control regulation at issue in Braschi.2 4
But why did Braschi's lawyer resist giving a definition, a specifica-

tion of what he meant by "family"?

Was it to avoid "essentializing"

21. Full disclosure: I first met William Rubenstein, the ACLU attorney who argued Braschi's case (now a Professor of Law at the U.C.L.A. School of Law), while I
was working on the Legal Aid Society's Amicus Brief in the Braschi case. Indeed, the
section of the brief I worked on adopted Professor Rubenstein's theory of the case,
focusing exclusively on a constitutional argument predicated on the Court of Appeals'
line of zoning cases. After his success in Braschi, I worked with him as part of a
coalition urging the state agency to promulgate regulations codifying Braschi. I was
also co-counsel with him in Rent Stabilization Ass'n v. Higgins, successfully fending
off a landlord challenge to those regulations. When I taught "Sexual Orientation and
the Law" at Cardozo Law School, I used his groundbreaking text, WILLIAM B. RuBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW (2d ed. 1997). He generously provided me with copies of the ACLU submissions in Braschifor my preparation of this
article. Thus, I have the highest respect for the work that Professor Rubenstein has
done in advancing equality for gay and lesbian persons and families, including his
pioneering work in the Braschi case. The critique offered here should in no way be
interpreted as diminishing that respect.
22. See generally Group House of Port Wash., Inc. v. Bd. of Zoning & Appeals,
380 N.E.2d 207 (N.Y. 1978); McMinn v. Town of Oyster Bay, 488 N.E.2d 1240 (N.Y.
1985).
23. See generally Group House of Port Wash., 380 N.E.2d at 208, 210 (two adults
and seven foster children living as a "single housekeeping unit"); McMinn, 488 N.E.2d
at 1242 (four unrelated young men sharing a residence while attending school).
24. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 54 n.3 (N.Y. 1989) ("We note,
however, that the definition of family that we adopt here for purposes of the noneviction protection of the rent-control laws is completely unrelated to the concept of
'functional family,' as that term has developed under this court's decisions in the context of zoning ordinances.").
628
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gay and lesbian relationships by tying them too closely to a heteronormative couple/marriage iconography?2 15 This concern about too
narrowly circumscribing the concept of gay and lesbian families would
be raised by Kath Weston in her seminal work on gay and lesbian
families of choice two years later, expressing a concern that a focus on
gay and lesbian couples or parents with children would narrow the
definition of gay and lesbian families, excluding other relationships of
emotional and financial support.2 6 This concern was given its most
famous articulation in the debate between Paula Ettelbrick and Tom
Stoddard about the value of same-sex marriage, in which Ettelbrick
' 2' 7
queried, "Since When is Marriage a Path to Liberation?
Professor Arthur Leonard, in a comprehensive discussion of the history and litigation choices in the Braschi case, describes the ACLU
lawyers' theory of the case as follows:
[T]hey contended that the court either should adopt a broader understanding of the term "family," as had Justice Baer,2 8 or alterna25. Concerns regarding essentialism were expressed by commentators almost immediately after the Braschi decision. See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 4, at 975 n.8, 979
n.30 (and works cited there); Mary Anne Case, Couples and Coupling in the Public
Sphere: A Comment on the Legal History of Litigating for Lesbian and Gay Rights, 79
VA. L. REV. 1643, 1663-66 (1993) (arguing that Braschi constricts gay and lesbian
family choices and compels gays and lesbians to "pass" or act like conservative
straight married couples). But see Ariela R. Dubler, Wifely Behavior: A Legal History
of Acting Married, 100 COLUM. L. REV. 957, 1020 (2000) (demonstrating that Braschi
was both "subversive" and "conservative" in that it allowed for a radical redefinition
of "acting married," but also incorporated that redefinition into "traditional" indicia
of marriage).

26.

WESTON,

supra note 5, at 209-10.

27. Paula Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LooK
NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN Q., (Fall 1999), and Thomas Stoddard, Why Gay People
Should Seek the Marry, OUT/LooK NAT'L GAY & LESBIAN Q., (Fall 1999), (reprinted

in

WILLIAM

B.

RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW

716, 716-25 (2d

ed. 1997)). But see Mary Anne Case, Lecture, Marriage Licenses, 89 MINN. L. REV.
1758, 1774 (2005) (arguing in response to Ettelbrick's critique and a Braschi functional-family approach that "[b]ut for the lingering cloud of repressive history hanging
over marriage, it would be clear that marriage today provides far more license, and
has the potential to be far more flexible, liberatory and egalitarian than most available alternatives."). For a comprehensive history of how same-sex marriage has come
to dominate the contemporary gay and lesbian rights movement, see CHAUNCEY,
supra note 11.
28. Justice Harold J. Baer was the trial judge in the Braschi case, whose decision
had been reversed by the Appellate Division. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., No. 2194/
87, 1987 WL 343445 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 27, 1987) rev'd, 531 N.Y.S.2d 562 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1988), rev'd, 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y.1989). Baer relied primarily on the description
of "family" in In re Adult Anonymous II, as "a continuing relationship of love and
care, and an assumption of responsibility for some other person." 452 N.Y.S.2d 198,
201 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982) (approving adoption of same-sex "lover"), overruled by In
re Adoption of Robert Paul P., 471 N.E.2d 424 (N.Y. 1984). Applying that standard,
Justice Baer found that "Braschi and Blanchard ... were together in a meaningful,
close and loving relationship. They were economically, socially and physically a
couple like any traditional couple except their relationship could not be legally consummated.... The present action demonstrates a nontraditional unit that had existed
for over ten years and fulfills any definitional criteria of the term 'family."' Braschi29
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tively that the court should rule that the equal protection clauses of
the federal and state constitutions would be offended by a succession rule that excluded gay couples from its protection. z9
To the extent that Professor Leonard accurately describes the lawyer's theory of the case, and the Author believes he is substantially
correct, this still does not explain his resistance to responding more
specifically to the Court's repeated inquiry: "How do you define 'family'?" Indeed, Braschi's lawyers appeared to acknowledge that some
criteria or "referents" were necessary for landlords and courts to be
able to distinguish between roommates and family.3 0
Thus, in the end, Braschi's lawyer had to give the Court some hint
of what he meant by "family." Accordingly, more than ten minutes
into his 22-minute oral argument, and then again about five minutes
later, he conceded that what the Court could do was to look to the
facts of the case before them or to use "indicia," what he later referred to merely as "ideas," by which the "functional and factual
equivalent" of a family could be determined in the eviction context.
Nevertheless, even these facts and indicia of the couple's emotional
and financial commitment to each other were conceded almost grudgingly by Braschi's lawyer at oral argument (although somewhat more
developed in the briefs) in response to two of Judge Bellacosa's inquiries: "Is [your definition of family] as broad as that?" And later:
"Do you agree that we would have to, in order to decide the case
properly and come out with a rule of law that could help us decide it
properly, that we would have to recite what those indicia or criteria
are in terms of the effectuation of a functional family in order to distinguish, for example, the roommate situation."
But the facts and indicia of the Braschi-Blanchard relationship were
extremely traditional, dyadic, and spousal: long-term, apparent monogamy, one more dependent on the other for financial support, formal documentation (joint banking accounts, credit cards, power of
1987 WL343445, at 2-3. However, other than his reference to the general language
quoted above from In the Matter of Adult Anonymous II, Justice Baer did not specify
any of those "definitional criteria." See id.
29. ARTHUR S. LEONARD, SEXUALITY AND THE LAW: AN ENCYCLOPEDIA OF MAJOR LEGAL CASES 365 (1993). However, it should be noted that the constitutional
argument was relegated to only about three minutes out of Braschi's lawyer's 22minute oral argument and was not even alluded to in the Braschi decision.
30. See, e.g., Braschi Brief, supra note 20, at 52 n.37; Braschi Reply Brief, supra
note 20, at 22 n.14. Accordingly, it is clear that Braschi's lawyers understood that
some definition or description or criteria of family would have to be articulated
whether the Court adopted their "functional and factual equivalent of family" or
equal protection theories. However, reference to those "indicia" was buried in two
footnotes in the briefs. In addition, at oral argument, when Judge Bellacosa put the
question to Braschi's lawyer directly whether it would be necessary for the Court "to
erect, enact those indicia as part of definition of family," Braschi's lawyer did not
agree with that proposition, nor did he provide the Court with the terms of such
630
indicia.
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attorney, health care proxy, a will with Braschi designated as primary
beneficiary and executor), 3' plus a unique class status-Blanchard was
a multi-millionaire and Braschi inherited most of his estate. 32 In addition, the "indicia" or "ideas" mentioned by Braschi's attorney at oral
argument were articulated in vague terms and were limited to couples,
i.e., "that they held themselves out as family, that they assumed responsibilities for one another[,] . . . that their relationship had some
permanence."
Thus, contrary to Braschi's lawyers' possible de-essentializing, "decoupling" goal, their approach would arguably have had a very limited
application to other gay and lesbian, and other functional families had
it been adopted by the Court as the norm or the indicia of "family."
In fact, Judge Bellacosa suggested just such an approach in his concurrence, i.e., to limit the Court's findings to the facts of the case and
conclude that, given those facts, it would be unreasonable not to include Braschi (and perhaps others "such as petitioner") within the
definition of family 33-what the two dissenters called an "ipse dixit"
approach.34 However, such an approach would have had questionable
application to other cases. 3 Even in 1989 it should have been clear to
31. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989) (reciting facts of
Braschi and Blanchard's relationship).
32. Braschi's lawyer omitted these facts, which of course showed that Braschi
would not face homelessness or destitution if he were evicted, from the briefs and at
oral argument. The landlord's advocate made passing reference to them in his brief.
See Brief of Defendant-Respondent at 3, 11 n.9, Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543
N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 02194-87).
33. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 56-57.
34. Id. at 57.
35. Indeed, some commentators had argued shortly after the Braschi decision was
handed down that the concurrence's more circumscribed approach would limit the
precedential value of the Braschi plurality decision. See, e.g., LEONARD, supra note
29, at 366 (". . . Bellacosa's decision describes the scope of [Braschi's] precedential
value."); Gardner, supra note 12, at 382-83 (arguing that Braschi's limited statutory,
rather than constitutional basis, and the fact that it was only a plurality decision would
limit its precedential value). These dire predictions have been shown to be overblown. See supra notes 12-18 and accompanying text (describing impact of Braschi
decision). In addition, Judge Bellacosa's concurrence, with its more limited view of
the protections that should be afforded gay and lesbian, and other families, has become a footnote in the history of Braschi's influence. Rather, it is Judge Titone's
plurality opinion that has guided the ensuing history of the application of Braschi. See
Hon. Judith S. Kaye, A Tribute to Law and Humanity: Judge Vito J.Titone, 61 ALB. L.
REV. 1391, 1393 n.9 (1998) (noting that, by 1998, Judge Titone's plurality opinion had
been cited in 67 cases and 209 secondary sources). However, had Judge Bellacosa's
approach been adopted by the Court, Braschi would have had a much more limited
application. Indeed, in his concurrence in Rent Stabilization Ass'n. v. Higgins, which
upheld the regulations that codified the Braschi decision and extended it to all regulated housing, Judge Bellacosa, clearly uncomfortable with the regulatory expansion
of Braschi, urged the legislature to limit the administrative agency's authority. 630
N.E.2d 626, 635 (N.Y. 1993). "In the distribution and delegation of governmental
powers, it is quite momentous that any administrative agency possess the potent public policy power to extend the durational and relational sweep of the plurality rationale of Braschi, including fully into the rent stabilization category and more widelY6 3 1
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Braschi's lawyers that most functional families-gay, lesbian, and
others-would have difficulty meeting the standard suggested by the

facts of the Braschi- B!anchard relationship. In fact, more than fifteen
years of litigation post-Braschi has shown that few families have such
a plethora of formalized indicia of their relationship, especially the
level of formalized financial intermingling found in the BraschiBlanchard relationship.3 6 Indeed, in the early days of post-Braschilitigation, landlords consistently compared claimants' families to the
facts of Braschi and found them wanting-stressing Braschi and
Blanchard's longevity,37 exclusivity,3 8 formalization of financial3 9 and
than was allowed even in the rent control field." Id. (citation omitted). But see Judith
S. Kaye, Things Judges Do: State Statutory Interpretation, 13 TOURO L. REV. 595, 611
n.62 (1997) (noting that the promulgation of the succession regulations, rather than
reflecting an administrative agency misinterpreting the reach of the Braschi plurality
decision, merely demonstrated that "[t]he regulators apparently agreed with us in
Braschi .... ).
36. See BALDACCI, supra note 12, at 26-34, 37-40 (discussing cases showing the
lack of formalized financial intermingling in same-sex and other functional families);
Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the FunctionalApproach to
the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1654 (1991) ("Some traditionally married couples, for example, keep their legal and financial affairs
separate.").
37. See, e.g., Fetner v. Fenner, N.Y.L.J., Nov. 21, 1990, at 22 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1990)
(distinguishing voluntary separation from Fenner after three years from lifetime relationship ended by death of partner in Braschi); Allerton Assoc. v. Shannon, N.Y.L.J.,
Feb. 26, 1993, at 26 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. Bronx Co. 1993) ("In each of the cases cited above,
clearly one (1) criteria or element stands out above all, i.e., longevity of the
relationship .... ").
38. See, e.g., Arnie Realty v. Torres, N.Y.L.J., Oct. 4, 1995, at 27 (N.Y. Civ. Ct.,
Bronx Co. 1995), affd N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1999, at 27 (N.Y. App. Term. 1999), affd 294
A.D.2d 193 (N.Y. App. Div. 2002) ("even assuming, arguendo, that the respondent
had a sexual relationship with [a woman] and fathered one or both of her children,
that fact alone would not preclude his having a gay sexual relationship with [the decedent]. The possibility that he may have been unfaithful to [the decedent] does not
make non-credible his testimony or that of [the priest who performed a "ceremony of
Union'] regarding the relationship that existed between [them]." (emphasis added)).
Thus, the claim of some commentators that Braschi protections are only possible
where the court disregards the sexual nature of the couple's relationship is simply
wrong. See, e.g., Case, supra note 25, at 1659-61 (arguing that the Braschi Court could
"bless a couple without blessing their sexual activities" because Braschi's lover was
dead. Id. at 1660). It should also be noted that courts also eventually rejected landlord claims that an existing marriage to another person in and of itself should defeat a
succession claim. Smith v. Attwood, N.Y.L.J., May 18, 1990, at 21 (N.Y. App. Term
1989) (reversing lower court which had held that succession protections could never
extend to an extra marital relationship); Lepar Realty Corp. v. Griffin, 581 N.Y.S.2d
521 (N.Y. App. Term 1991) (per curiam) (noting that although respondent was married to another, that fact was not dispositive; instead, the court looked to emotional
and financial relationship, familial interdependence, fathering child with tenant, and
duration of residence to determine right of succession); Fernbach L.L.C. v. Cash,
N.Y.L.J., April 17, 2003, at 20 (N.Y. App. Term 2002) (per curiam) (noting that Braschi's totality of the relationship, not existence of spouses, determines eviction
protection).
39. BALDACCI, supra note 12, at 26-31, 27-40 (discussing cases where courts gave
dispositive weight to paucity of formalized financial intermingling); but see idbf
6
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estate matters, 4° etc.-and arguing that Braschi and the regulations
that codified Braschi were limited to those facts.4 1
Further, the approach suggested by Braschi's lawyers and adopted
to some extent by Judge Bellacosa is subject to the critique of Professor Suzanne Goldberg and others regarding fact-based adjudication
that avoids the normative questions, which approach results not only
in ipse dixit decision-making, but is also fraught with misreadings of
the socially-constructed facts and norms themselves.4 2
Since, as seen above, the oral argument did not give the Court its
more amplified, nuanced fact-specific normative narrative regarding
gay and lesbian families and other families of choice, and since the
brief-in-chief only alluded to such narratives as examples of functional-families 43 rather than as illustrative of normative indicia of such
families, where did the Court get the content of the "rule," the indicia
of family which it enunciated and held should be applied as objective
criteria to the facts of this and other family eviction cases?
There were at least two sources. First, there were hints in the Braschi briefs. The lawyers pointed in some detail to cases that found that
financially and emotionally committed persons should be considered
"family." 44 However, in the flow of the Brief with its emphasis on the
zoning cases, these eviction cases seem to be not much more than examples of the "functional and factual equivalent of family" 4 5-no
more or less family than the groups of people cooking meals together
in other statuin the zoning cases or "unitary households" as defined
46
tory schemes also referred to in the Braschi brief.
Thus, by the end of the oral argument, after at least three of the six
judges had repeatedly asked the question, "How do you define family
and where do you get that definition from?" and even after reading
22-26, 31-34 (discussing later cases where lack of formalized financial intermingling
did not defeat succession claims).
40. See, e.g., 390 W. End Assocs. v. Wildfoerster, 241 A.D.2d 402 (N.Y. App. Div.
1997) (rejecting succession claim primarily because of decedent's failure to execute a
will, even though same-sex partner was economically dependent on him); but see
Arnie Realty Corp. v. Torres, N.Y.L.J., June 3, 1999, at 27 (N.Y. Civ. Ct., Bronx Co.
1995) (failure of older same-sex partner to leave entire insurance policy and estate to
younger man does not defeat succession claim).
41. See supra notes 36-40.
42. See Suzanne B. Goldberg, Constitutional Tipping Points: Civil Rights, Social
Change, and Fact-Based Adjudication, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 1955, 1962 n.18 (2006)
(citing Cass R. Sunstein, The Supreme Court, 1995 Term-Foreword: Leaving Things
Undecided, 110 HARV. L. REV. 4 (1996) (discussing undertheorized decisions)). I
would agree that the Braschi concurrence avoided the normative question, but I disagree with Professor Goldberg that the Braschi plurality decision also avoided normative questions regarding "family." See Goldberg, supra at 1977-78 n.86.
43. See Braschi Brief, supra note 20, at 21.
44. See id. at 21-25.
45. Id. at 21 ("[These cases] are indicative of the types of functional families that
have been protected against eviction." (emphasis added).
46. Id. at 28-42.
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Braschi's lawyers' briefs, the Court was left with little more than the
response: From your line of zoning cases in which you used the "functional and factual equivalent of family" standard, which you should
interpret here in light of the purposes of the eviction statute. But, as
Judge Hancock queried, "How would anyone know what the statute
meant if that were the answer we were to give?"
Of course, the plurality did not adopt that approach.47 Thus, we are
still left with our original question: where did the Court get the definition, indicia, factors which it enunciated with specificity as the new
"rule" to be applied in future cases? Well, the Author would suggest
that they got it from two lines of cases4 8 hinted at in the Braschi briefs,
but almost exclusively focused on in the amicus briefs, particularly
those of the Legal Aid Society, Gay Mens Health Crisis ("GMHC")
and other AIDS groups, and Lambda Legal Defense and Education
Fund ("Lambda").4 9 First, the Legal Aid Society and Lambda emphasized for the Court the factual reality of same-sex couples (primarily
marriage equivalents) and other families of choice."0 The GMHC
brief 5' gave brief synopses of about twenty cases in which survivors of
persons who died of AIDS, many of whom themselves had AIDS,
were being forced from their homes (as did the brief of the City of
New York). 2 In short hand, the GMHC Brief described the love and
commitment of these families in the face of illness and death. 3 The
Legal Aid and Lambda briefs also described the facts of numerous
cases in which gay, lesbian, poor, and disabled persons exhibited lives
of mutual support and commitment.
By presenting these narratives to the Court, the amici enhanced the
Court's awareness of the large number of functional families, the descriptive normative core of their relationships (emotional and financial commitment and interdependence; dedication, caring and self47. See supra notes 31-35 and accompanying text.
48. For a more fully developed accounting of the analysis that follows regarding
these two lines of cases, see Baldacci, supra note 4, at 975-80.
49. See LEONARD, supra note 29, at 365-66 (describing the numerous amici briefs
and the role they played in the litigation); Lynn M. Kelly, Lawyering for Poor Communities on the Cusp of the Next Century, 25 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 721, 723-24 (1998)
(same); Madeleine Schachter, The Utility of Pro Bono Representation of U.S.-Based
Amicus Curiae in Non-U.S. and Multi-national Courts as a Means of Advancing the
Public Interest, 28 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 88, 102 (2004) (describing the role of amici in
Braschi as 'broaden[ing] the scope of the court's determination .. . and demonstrat[ing] the broad political support for [Braschi's] position").
50. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of the Legal Aid Society of New York City,
Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 2194/87).); Brief Amicus
Curiae of Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund in Support of Plaintiff-Appellant (hereinafter Lambda Brief).
51. See generally Brief Amicus Curiae of the Gay Men's Health Crisis, Inc. et al.,
Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 2194/87).
52. See id. at 23-34.
53. See id. at 35.
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sacrifice), 4 the devastating consequences of their eviction from their
family homes, and the recognition of these relationships as "family"
by lower courts. Amici's articulation of these core functions by which
to identify "family" was adopted by the Braschi court: "it is the totality
of the relationship as evidence by the dedication, caring and self-sacri55
fice of the parties which should, in the final analysis, control.
The Legal Aid Brief in particular highlighted and analyzed a second
line of cases which was merely referred to in two footnotes in Braschi's Brief and Reply Brief. 6 That is, the Legal Aid Brief elaborated
and set forth proposed "indicia distinguishing a 'family' from other
household living arrangements"S7-precisely the question the Court
was asking. These "indicia" were culled from a second line of cases
that utilized a more fully articulated social science-based functional
definition of "family." The major case in this category put forth by
the Legal Aid Society, 2-4 Realty Assocs. v. Pittman, 8 was a Housing
Court eviction case litigated by the Harlem Legal Aid Office, not an
impact or law reform case. In that case, Jimmie Hendrix, a forty-eight
year old African-American man, claimed that he and had lived for
over twenty-five years with Mr. Pittman in Harlem as father and son.
Hendrix and his mother had moved to Harlem from the south and
rented a room from Pittman. But gradually "the relationship develloyalty and love ....
oped into one of devoted concern, sharing, trust,
59
Jimmie found the father he had never had."
54. Regarding the literature demonstrating general agreement, even among antiessentialist scholars, regarding these core functions of family being at least accurate
descriptive if not normative functions, see Baldacci, supra note 4, at 979 n.30; NARDI,
supra note 4, at 59-73; Levit, supra note 12, at 907.
55. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989)( emphasis added).
56. Braschi Brief, supra note 20, at 52 n.37; Braschi Reply Brief, supra note 21, at
22 n.14. Indeed, the footnote in the Braschi Brief suggests that "adequate criteria
exist by which to identify persons who meet the McMinn standard for 'functional and
factual equivalent of a natural family.'" Braschi Brief, supra note 21, at 57 n.37; It
then goes on to cite two eviction cases as suggestive of those criteria, including 2-4
Realty Assocs. v. Pittman, 137 Misc.2d 898 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987), affd [after
the Braschi decision] at 144 Misc.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Term 1st Dep't. 1989). Braschi
Brief, supra note 20, at 57 n.37. However, as shown above, at oral argument, Braschi's lawyer resisted putting forth those "criteria" as a functional definition of "family" for eviction purposes.
57. Brief Amicus Curiae of the Legal Aid Society of New York City, Braschi v.
Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989) (No. 2194/87).
58. 2-4 Realty Assocs. v. Pittman, 137 Misc.2d 898 (N.Y. Civ. Ct. N.Y. Co. 1987),
affd [after the Braschi decision] 144 Misc.2d 311 (N.Y. App. Term 1st Dep't. 1989).
As noted above, references to Pittman and other such cases were proffered as examples of functional families, not as sources of a normative standard that could be applied in other cases. See supra notes 43-45 and accompanying text. In the oral
argument, Braschi's lawyer twice referred to Pittman and its citation in the Legal Aid
Brief not as a source of a definition of family, but merely as illustrative of the fact that
this case had implications for functional families beyond those of gay and lesbian
couples.
59. 137 Misc.2d at 899.
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By highlighting this case, the Legal Aid Society (and other amici)
set out for the Court a sociologically-based functional definition of
"family," establishing through expert testimony that such functional
families were common among African-American families. The amici
also emphasized the testimony of the expert witness, a sociologist,
which had been cited at length by the Pittman Court, regarding "criteria" used by sociologists "in determining whether a true family unit
exists."' 6° These criteria are:
(1) the longevity of the relationship;
(2) the level of commitment and support among its members...
both materially and emotionally;
(3) the sense in which the individuals define themselves as a family
unit ...

and also the way that neighbors and other institutions

define them as a family unit;
(4) the way in which members of the unit came to rely on each
other to provide daily family services;
(5) the shared history of the group ...
61
(6) the high degree of religious and moral commitment.
Applying these criteria, the Pittman Court noted that the expert found
that Pittman and Hendrix were a "family" as evidenced by their "dedication, caring and self-sacrifice. '6 2 As noted above, the Braschi
Court adopted this exact phrase to summarize the new "rule," the
standard which "should, in the final analysis, control., 63 In addition,
the Braschi Court also adopted whole cloth Pittman's holistic, functional definition of "family" and the articulated functional factors, using the same or similar language, with some further amplification of
individual factors.64
60. Id. at 902.
61. Id.
62. Id.
63. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 55 (N.Y. 1989).
64. See id. It is beyond the scope of this essay to survey and engage the critiques
of the Court's adopting these factors. I have previously surveyed some of this literature. See works cited in Baldacci, supra note 4, at 979 n.30, 981 n.37, 993 n.96. Regarding the critique that the factors are vague and unpredictable, see Minow, supra note 4,
at 276-84; Gardner, supra note 12, at 382-83; Hubert J. Barnhardt, III, Comment, Let
the Legislatures Define the Family: Why Default Statutes Should Be Used to Eliminate
Potential Confusion, 40 EMORY L.J. 571, 609. But see Sally F. Goldfarb, Visitation for
Nonparents After Troxel v. Grandville: Where Should States Draw the Line?, 32
RUTGERS L.J. 783, 793 n.54 (2001) ("By limiting judicial discretion, specific [functional] factors can reduce the incidence of arbitrary, biased, or unfounded decisions.
Specific factors also make outcomes more uniform and predictable and thereby encourage parties to settle their disputes out of court or, in some instances, not to file
suit at all.") (emphasis added). Regarding the critique that proving one meets the
factors is intrusive and discriminatory in that it does not subject legally licensed relationship to such scrutiny, see, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 4, at 991-93; Case, supra note
25, at 1664-66. It should be noted, however, that although spouses, parents, children
and siblings do not need to demonstrate any emotional or financial interrelationship,
they still must demonstrate the same duration of co-residency as functional families36
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Would the Court have so whole heartedly accepted the reality of
gay and lesbian, and other families without the contributions of amici
described above?65 Would it have answered the question Braschi's
lawyer resisted answering in the same way? Would it have culled the
same standard and indicia from the same eviction cases referred to in
the Braschi Brief and Reply Brief without amici's highlighting these
indicia?66 We will never know. It is clear that the plurality and the
concurrence acknowledged that it would be "unreasonable" not to include the Braschi-Blanchard relationship and other such relationships
within the ordinary understanding of family, at least within the eviction context.6 7 In extending the Braschi functional-family approach
beyond rent control's 10,000 apartments to rent stabilization's over
one million apartments, the Appellate Division also indicated that it
would be "arbitrary and capricious" not to do so. 68 The Court of Appeals' later decisions regarding second-parent adoption 69 and non-dis70
criminatory treatment of same-sex couples in other housing contexts
See BALDACCI, supra note 12, at 13 n.l, 40-45 (discussing cases prohibiting inquiry
into family bona fides, but requiring proof of co-residency).
65. On the role of amici in general and particularly in Braschi, see Schachter,
supra note 50, at 89-92, 100-111.
66. The Braschi dissent would apparently answer in the affirmative. "Plaintiff
maintains that the machinery for such decisions is in place and that appropriate guidelines can be constructed. He refers particularly to a formulation outlined by the court
in 2-4 Realty Assocs. v. Pittman (137 Misc 2d 898, 902) which sets forth six different
factors to be weighed. The plurality has essentially adopted his formulation." Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 60 (Simons, J., dissenting). For the reasons stated above, I would
disagree with the dissent's characterization of the specificity of the plaintiff's proposing the Pittman factors as "guidelines." As noted above, the Pittman factors were
buried and referred to only obliquely in two footnotes in Braschi's briefs. See supra
text accompanying footnotes 30, 56. In addition, at oral argument, the two references
to Pittman were merely illustrative of the proposition that the case had implications
beyond gay and lesbian couples, not that Pittman provided the Court with the functional definition that it had been inquiring after. Nevertheless, I would agree that the
plurality did, in fact, adopt the Pittman "formulation."
67. Id. at 54 (plurality opinion), 55 (concurring opinion).
68. E. 10th St. Assocs. v. Estate of Goldstein, 154 A.D.2d 142, 145-146 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990).
69. In the Matter of Jacob and Dana, 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (interpreting
"parent" to include a "de facto parent" for second parent adoption purposes). The
Court-and implicitly the utility and consistency of a functional approach in family
law cases-had been criticized for its not even mentioning, let alone applying Braschi's functional approach to an earlier child visitation case. In the Matter of Alison D.,
572 N.E.2d 27 (N.Y. 1991) (rejecting lesbian partner's visitation petition, holding that
"parent" for visitation purposes is limited to "biological parent"). However, in a persuasive dissent in that case, Judge Kaye reminded that majority that it had only recently recognized in Braschi the Court's duty and ability to recognize "modern-day
realities in giving definition to statutory concepts." Id. at 33. A brief four years later,
now Chief Judge Kaye rectified that wrong in her opinion in In the Matter of Jacob
and Dana. 660 N.E.2d 397 (N.Y. 1995) (recognizing de facto parent's right to adopt
jointly-raised child of same sex-partner who was biological mother of the child).
70. Levin v. Yeshiva Univ., 754 N.E.2d 1099, 1110 (N.Y. 2001) (quoting Braschi
court plurality's conclusion that a tenant's same-sex life partner qualified as "family"
under the non-eviction protection provisions of the New York City rent control law,
637
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relied on Braschi and also frequently spoke of the unreasonableness
of not protecting such functional families from discriminatory and unequal treatment. Thus, perhaps what the Court was most persuaded
by was simply the irrationality of not protecting Braschi and, by extension, other such "families" from eviction from their family homes.
Professor Toni Massaro, almost twenty years ago in the wake of the
shame of Bowers, urged a move from what Massaro called "thick"
rights-constitutional doctrines of privacy based on fundamental
rights or equal protection strict scrutiny-as bases for litigating gay
rights cases to what Massaro called "thin rights," i.e., appeals to a
heightened rationality argument based on compelling narratives of the
lives of gay/lesbian persons. 71 By this route, Massaro argued, advocates could gradually bring not only public opinion, but also the courts
to a tipping point, where the cultural/ideological supports, biases
(both individual and cultural) that undermine anti-gay/lesbian dis72
criminatory treatment are seen, or at least exposed, as "irrational.
Massaro's thin-rights rationality analysis is similar to Posner's call for
a fact-based critique of the received sexual orthodoxies,7 3 including
the "hidden determinants" underlying Bowers-gay as the other, as
contagion, as having nothing to do with family. 4
Such a fact-based critique of gay/lesbian discriminatory treatment
was eventually articulated in Lawrence v. Texas, with its rationality
emphasis on the dignity due to the relational choices made by gays
and lesbians.7 5 I have described elsewhere how the fact-less, doctrinefocused approach of Hardwick's lawyers in Bowers failed to challenge
the hidden cultural determinants, whereas the fact-rich narratives that
were at the core of Romer fully informed the tone of respect that permeated the Romer decision's call for treating gays and lesbians with
dignity.76 Posner has also noted that the Bowers decision's "bland
decorousness and formulaic generality" and its giving "short shrift to
fact and policy" was reflective of the "tone and emphasis of Hardwick's brief."' 77 Professor Lawrence Tribe, Hardwick's lawyer, in a

defining family to include "two adult lifetime partners whose relationship is long-term
and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence.").
71. Toni M. Massaro, Gay Rights, Thick and Thin, 49 STAN. L. REV. 45 (1996).
72. See id. at 92-110; cf. Goldberg, supra note 42, at 1975-84 (discussing "tipping
points" that arise in fact-based adjudication that may also give rise to new normative
judgments regarding outlier groups).
73. See RICHARD A. POSNER, SEX AND REASON 293, 346-50 (1992).
74. See Anne B. Goldstein, Comment, History, Homosexuality, and Political Values: Searchingfor the Hidden Determinants of Bowers v. Hardwick, 97 YALE L.J. 1073
(1988).
75. Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558, 574-75 (2003).
76. See generally Baldacci, supra note 3.
77. POSNER, supra note 73, at 346.
61q

https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/txwes-lr/vol13/iss2/14
DOI: 10.37419/TWLR.V13.I2.13

20

Baldacci: Protecting Gay and Lesbian Families From Eviction From Their Home

2007]

PROTECTING FAMILIES FROM EVICTION

639

post-Romer article comparing that case with Lawrence, seems to acknowledge the same contrast.78
In 1989, the facts of the "dedication, caring and self-sacrifice" of
numerous gay, lesbian and other families were brought squarely
before the Braschi Court. However, Braschi's lawyers emphasized an
abstracted rule-"functional and factual equivalent of family"-by
which to protect their client. They did not, however, emphasize the
common facts of those relationships and help the Court cull from
those narratives an articulated normative rule; nor did they demonstrate the social science, jurisprudential and public policy sources of
such an articulated normative rule. Accordingly, their approach suffered from some of the same theoretical and tactical limitations noted
in the preceding paragraph.
In any event, their submissions, amplified by amicus briefs, helped
to make the narratives of these families so compelling that the Court
enunciated a new "rule" by which myriad forms of gay, lesbian, and
other functional families would be treated as "equally valid" to families based on "fictitious legal distinctions [such as marriage or adoption] and genetic history."79 It should be emphasized that the Braschi
decision in fact recognized a myriad of forms of gay, lesbian, and
other family choices and arrangements, not limiting that recognition
to spousal models.8" Indeed, later cases applying Braschi and the subsequent regulations codifying Braschi have recognized and protected
many non-spousal family arrangements that meet the indicia of family
from eviction."1 Thus, in spite of continued academic critiques of the
progressive value of Braschi,82 thousands of gay, lesbian, and other
78. See Tribe, supra note 3, at 1906-07. However, even in that article, Professor
Tribe still defends his decision to underplay the "gay" facts of the case, even somewhat condescendingly dismissing Hardwick's desire to emphasize the similarity between the personal sexual choices of gays and lesbians, and heterosexuals. Id. at
1952-53.
79. Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53 (N.Y. 1989).
80. This is a point frequently missed by those who critique Braschi as forcing gays
and lesbians to "pass" as a "conservative model of pair bonding." Case, supra note
25, at 1664. But see Dubler, supra note 25, at 1020 (arguing that rather than forcing
Braschi and Blanchard to conform to a spousal iconography, the Court "vindicated
their desire to conform to just that normative model."). Nevertheless, Dubler also
asserts that Braschi reinforces the marital paradigm at the expense of nontraditional
domestic arrangements. Id. However, this is simply not a necessary correlate or result
of the Braschi functional standard. It is clear from the plain language of Braschi and
the regulations codifying Braschi that neither the standard nor the factors are cast in
spousal-specific terms.
81. See, e.g., Baldacci, supra note 4, at 986-87 (describing cases in which non-marital families were recognized, including two women in a non-romantic relationship,
distant cousins, father-son relationship, mother-daughter relationship); see BALDACCI,
supra note 12, at 22-35 (same). Nevertheless, it should be noted that all of these cases
involved straight-identified or impliedly straight parties. I am unaware of any cases in
which non-coupled gay or lesbian-identified persons have asserted a family succession
claim.
82. See supra notes 4, 12, 25, 36, 38, 64, and 80.
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families of choice have been protected from eviction from their
homes, and those of us who litigate these cases on a regular basis can
attest to the enduring importance of Braschi'srecognition of gay and
lesbian families.

II.

THE BRASCHI COURT: CREATING A NEW WORLD OR
RECOGNIZING REALITY

So, we come to the second question the Author posed at the beginning: Was the Braschi Court courageously announcing a brave new
world of equal treatment for gay and lesbian families, or was it simply
recognizing the facts on the ground, those tipping points where a factbased inquiry exposes not only the reality of the persons before the
court, but their history and struggles, and the irrationality of continued exclusion and discrimination.
Well, if we are to take the Court at its own word, it was playing
catch-up and recognizing the broad contemporary reality of functional
families. After all, the Court's primary factual and jurisprudential
lens through which it viewed "family" anti-eviction protections was
what it called "the reality of family life," i.e., the various forms of
relationships of "emotional and financial commitment and interdependence" that had come into existence and which gave every indication of having achieved the status of being an "equally valid," "a more
realistic view of family." 8 3 The Court particularly noted that such a
view of family included "two adult lifetime partners,"84 and, in the
Braschi case, two same-sex adult life partners." To further support its
finding that many such families existed and could be identified, the
Court cited to the decisions in a number of lower courts over the preceding three years, including two same-sex life partner cases, that documented the existence of these families, including the evidence of
social science.8 6
Of course, the Court could have simply been trying to cover up
what the dissent perceived as the plurality's going "well beyond" and
being "inconsistent" with statutory language, legislative intent, and
prior common law regarding the meaning of "family" in the housing
context. 87 Thus, in one reading, the Court was simply trying to coordinate its arguably radical approach with doctrinal history. 88 Accord83. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54.
84. Id. at 54.
85. See id. at 55.
86. Id.
87. Id. at 57.
88. For an even more condemnatory reading, see Elizabeth Fajans & Mary R.
Falk, Shooting from the Lip: United States v. Dickerson, Role [Im]morality, and the
Ethics of Legal Rhetoric, 23 U. HAW. L. REV. 1 (2000).
[T]he [Braschi] court was not in fact prepared to accept new social configurations of family and did not give the real reasons for its decision in Braschi.
It is interesting to speculate why. One significant omission in the Braschi 640
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ing to this reading, the Court masks this discontinuity by simply
declaring that its "view [of family] comports both with our society's
traditional concept of 'family' and with the expectations of those who
live in such nuclear units."89
However, the Author is inclined to take the Court at its word,9"
especially in light of the factual history of gay, lesbian, and other famidecision is any mention of the fact the tenant of record died of AIDS and
that eviction might render homeless his life partner, a man quite possibly at
risk of AIDS himself. Given this possibility, one could speculate that compassion motivated the Braschi result rather than social policy, but that the
court was uncomfortable resting its decision upon such grounds. The court's
less than candid reasoning made it impossible to predict its future actions,
resulting in a flood of pointless litigation and disappointed hopes .... When
judges write "dishonest" opinions, predictability suffers, as in Braschi. In addition, truth suffers, as does the cohesion between court and counsel, governing and governed.
Id. at 19-20 n.91(internal citation omitted). Besides being mean-spirited, this critique
gets the facts wrong. As noted above, Braschi would inherit millions and, thus, did
not face homelessness-the lynchpin of Fajans and Falk's "dishonest compassion"
theory. They present no other evidence that the Court was not giving its real reasons
for adopting a functional definition of family. In any event, I would note Judge
Kaye's encomium to Supreme Court Justice William J. Brennan Jr.: "Justice Brennan
has been a tenacious opponent of those who would have us believe in the concept of
'rational certainty'-that there is 'no room for compassion in the cold calculus of
judging."' Judith S. Kaye, State Courts at the Dawn of a New Century: Common Law
Courts Reading Statutes and Constitutions, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1, 2 (1995).
89. Braschi, 543 N.E.2d at 54.
90. Chief Judge Kaye has written about the role of courts in interpreting statutory
language, as the Court of Appeals did in Braschi, to bring it into conformity with
modern realities. See, e.g., Kaye, supra note 35, at 609 (" . .. I have in mind the
situation where though the balance of a statute remains relevant, a litigant raises a
novel theory of the statute's applicability to an entire category of cases unforeseen, if
not unforeseeable, by the Legislature. This, too, is not an infrequent event. It is here
where judges must use the same approach they would for developing the common
law, filling the gaps inevitably arising from the complex interplay between human
facts and abstract laws. That is precisely what the Court of Appeals did in a much
discussed statutory interpretation case several years ago called Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. Co."); Kaye, supra note 88, at 32-33 (describing the necessary role courts play in
interpreting statutes and applying them to situations not anticipated by legislators,
such as in Braschi). See also Jane S. Schacter, Metademocracy: The Changing Structure of Legitimacy in Statutory Interpretation, 108 HARV. L. REV. 593, 629-30 ("This
[statutory interpretation] approach [in Braschi] can be understood within the complementarian model. The court minimized the importance of actual legislative intent,
appealed to the virtue of statutory efficacy, read the term "family" with reference to
contemporary understandings, and acted as a policymaking partner by supplying criteria for assessing familial status. The court invoked as its ultimate guideposts broad
notions of justice, contemporary experience, and fairness as opposed to the more narrow measure of legislative will."); Heidi A. Sorenson, Note, A New Gay Rights
Agenda? Dynamic Statutory Interpretationand Sexual OrientationDiscrimination, 81
GEO. L.J. 2105, 2121-22 (1993) ("Braschi v. Stahl Associates Co. is a classic case of
dynamic statutory interpretation in which New York's highest court protected the gay
life partner of a deceased tenant from eviction .... The court's dynamic construction
of the word 'family' was legitimate according to the criteria set forth by Eskridge
under his moderate approach to dynamic statutory interpretation.") (citing William
N. Eskridge, Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1479, 1497
(1987)); see WILLIAM N.ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATIO A 1
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lies put before it. That is, the plurality and the concurrence were convinced by the evidence-and probably by experiences in their own
lives-that families of choice had existed for sometime and that they
were so marked by levels of "dedication, caring and self-sacrifice" that

to deny that they are families, and thus to deny them protection from
eviction from their family homes, simply made no sense and could not
be seen to serve any public policy.9 1 Indeed, it was clear to them that
such a result was contrary to the public policy of protecting families

from such disruption and dislocation from their homes on the death or
departure of the tenant of record.9 2

Thus, for this Court-at least for the plurality-this decision was
perceived as a fairly non-controversial step. In fact, it was non-contro-

(1994) (expanding on this thesis). But see Scott Fruehwald, PragmaticTextualism and
the Limits of Statutory Interpretation:Dale v. Boy Scouts of America, 35 WAKE FOREST L. REV., 973, 984 (2000) ("The dynamic approach the court employed in this case
[Brashci] may produce a normatively appropriate result. A person who has depended
on another person in the same way that a person relies on another family member in a
traditional family has been protected from eviction. The court has updated the rent
control law to conform to the court's modern notion of family, even if the law's original drafters had not contemplated application of the law to such relationships. This
result, however, lacks a principled legal basis. The court's interpretation ignores any
meaning of family that the lawmakers could have intended at the time rent control
was established.") (citations omitted).
91. Writing for the plurality, Judge Titone concluded:
The intended protection against sudden eviction should not rest on fictitious
legal distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation in
the reality of family life. In the context of eviction, a more realistic, and
certainly equally valid, view of a family includes two adult lifetime partners
whose relationship is long term and characterized by an emotional and financial commitment and interdependence. This view comports both with
our society's traditionalconcept of "family" and with the expectations of individuals who live in such nuclear units.... Hence, it is reasonable to conclude
that, in using the term "family," the Legislature intended to extend protection
to those who reside in households having all of the normal familial
characteristics.
Braschi,543 N.E.2d at 53-54 (emphasis added; citations omitted). In his concurrence,
Judge Bellacosa similarly reasoned:
The best guidance available to the regulatory agency for correctly applying
the rule in such circumstances is that it would be irrationalnot to include this
petitioner [as a family member protected from eviction] and it is a more
reasonable reflection of the intention behind the regulation to protect a person
such as petitioner as within the regulation's class of "family." In that respect,
he qualifies as a tenant in fact for purposes of the interlocking provisions and
policies of the rent-control law.
Id. at 56 (emphasis added) (Bellacosa, J., concurring). Regarding the concurrence's
viewpoint, Judge Titone correctly comments, "We note that the concurrer apparently
agrees with our view of the purposes of the noneviction ordinance, and the impact this
purpose should have on the way in which this and future cases should be decided." Id.
at 54 n.2 (emphasis added; citation omitted).
92. See supra note 91.
642
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versial. 93 There was no public or political backlash. 94 Within six

months, functional-family eviction protections were extended by the
same middle-level appellate court that had earlier rejected Braschi's
claim to over one million rent-stabilized apartments.9 5 Within four
months, the Braschi factors were codified and extended by the state
agency in regulations. 96 Braschi's holding provided the basis for further recognition of the reality of gay and lesbian families, and the protections they deserved.9 7
In the recent oral argument regarding same-sex marriage before
this same Court, the fact of New York State's recognition of same-sex
93. However, an alternative reading might focus on the decision's being far more
"radical" and "controversial." Professor Leonard's description of Judge Titone's plurality decision is suggestive in this regard.
Judge Titone took a broader view in his plurality opinion [than the concurrence], employing language that provoked fascinated media attention due to
its suggestion of a major change in legal concept....
Titone's opinion embraced a broader concept of family than was necessary to decide Braschi's
petition for preliminary injunctive relief.
LEONARD, supra note 29, at 367 (emphasis added). Leonard then seems to criticize
Titone for delaying to late in the opinion any mention of the fact that the case involved two men. Id. However, I would suggest that by not limiting his decision to the
facts of the case - same-sex spousal-like couple, death of tenant from AIDS - Judge
Titone enunciated the broadest possible functional definition of family that encompassed myriad forms of family relationships and arrangements which were not tied to
sexual orientation, gender, spousal status, or death of the tenant. See supra notes
80-81 and accompanying text (describing myriad forms of families protected under
Braschi); see also supra note 111 (describing relationship of Braschi case to AIDS
pandemic).
94. An alarmist editorial in the New York Times, portending spying landlords and
overworked courts as a result of the Braschi decision, had no impact. Editorial, What's
a Family?; Turning Landlords into Spies, N.Y. TIMEs, July 11, 1989, at A18. A pending Governor's Program Bill that would have extended succession rights to roommates who had co-resided with a tenant for five years, but did not extend succession
rights to gay or lesbian life partners on the same terms as provided to married couples
and other legally-recognized family members, went nowhere. See Governor's Program Bill No. 136 (1989). Early versions of regulations proposed by the state agency
which only extended succession rights to functional families on the death of the tenant
were abandoned within months at the urging of a coalition of gay, lesbian, AIDS,
disability, tenant, and poverty advocates. See Kelly, supra note 49 (describing the
advocacy of the coalition with the state agency). Accordingly, within four months of
the Braschi decision, the state agency promulgated regulations on an emergency basis
which codified and extended the Braschidecision. The landlord challenge to the regulations was unanimously rejected by the Court of Appeals. Rent Stabilization Ass'n
v. Higgins, 630 N.E.2d 626, 629-30 (N.Y. 1993); cert. denied 512 U.S. 1213 (994).
95. E. 10th St. Assocs. v. Estate of Goldstein, 154 A.D.2d 142 (N.Y. App. Div.
1990) (extending eviction protection to surviving gay life partner of rent-stabilized
tenant who had died from AIDS). "It would be anomalous to hold that a life partner
could be a family member insofar as eviction from a rent-controlled apartment but
not a valid family member insofar as eviction from a rent-stabilized apartment is concerned." Id. at 145; see also Park Holding Co. v. Power, 554 N.Y.S.2d 861 (N.Y. App.
Div. 1990) (same on departure of tenant from apartment).
96. See Higgins, 630 N.E.2d at 629-30 (describing the promulgation and terms of
the regulations).
97. See supra notes 12-18, 68-70 and accompanying text.
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couples and its protecting of their relationships in Braschi and its
progeny was accepted as a matter of course, and provided in part the
public policy base from which the same-sex marriage question was argued.9" As in Braschi, the opponents' primary argument was that this
social change was a matter for the legislature. That argument was rejected in Braschi, in Higgins (upholding the codification of Braschi in
regulations), in Matter of Jacob and Dana (upholding second-parent
adoption), and in Levin (guaranteeing equal protection for same-sex
couples in university housing). Unfortunately, shortly after the Conference, that legislative-deference argument won the day in Hernandez. However, in Judge Kaye's dissent, she rued the fact that
"[s]olely because of their sexual orientation, however-that is, because of who they love-plaintiffs are denied the rights and responsibilities of civil marriage. This State has a proud tradition of affording
equal rights to all New Yorkers. Sadly, the Court today retreats from
that proud tradition."9 9 She then opined that "I am confident that
future generations will look back on today's decision as an unfortunate misstep." 10 Judge Kaye had written a similar dissent in Alison
D., when the Court inexplicably refused to extend the rationale of
Braschi to recognize a de facto same-sex parent for purposes of child
visitation. 10 ' Ultimately, her view prevailed.1 " 2 It can only be hoped
that a similar fate awaits the Hernandez decision so that gay and lesbian families, at least in their spousal configurations, are afforded full
equality with heterosexual marriages, advancing in yet another way
the recognition of gay and lesbian families begun in Braschi.
98. See Hernandez v. Robles, 855 N.E.2d 1 (N.Y. 2006). Even prior to the Court
of Appeals decision in Hernandez, one court relied on the Appellate Division decision in Hernandez (26 A.D.3d 98 (N.Y. App. Div. 1st Dep't. 2005)) in rejecting a
Braschi-based challenge to a rent-stabilization regulation that required a landlord to
add the spouse to a tenant's lease as a co-tenant, but not a life partner. Zagorsik v.
N.Y. State Div. of Hous. and Comty. Renewal, 817 N.Y.S.2d 486 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 2006).
99. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 22. Judge Kaye did not cite to Braschi since Hernandez was a constitutional, not a statutory interpretation case. Nevertheless, the
reasoning in her Hernandez dissent-the duty of the Court to interpret the state constitution in light of the modem reality of gay and lesbian couples living "married"
lives, but being denied the right to be legally married based on out-dated exclusionary
prejudices-was similar to the reasoning in Braschi. See supra note 90 (describing
Judge Kaye's view of dynamic statutory interpretation, exemplified by interpreting
the term "family" in Braschi in light of the "reality of family life." Braschi v. Stahl
Assocs. Co., 543 N.E.2d 49, 53 (N.Y. 1989)); see also Robert C. Post, The Supreme
Court, 2002 Term-Foreword:Fashioningthe Legal Constitution:Culture, Courts, and
Law, 117 HARV. L. REV. 4, 79-82 (2003) (describing how both constitutional and
statutory interpretation necessarily involve determinations regarding cultural meanings, both past and present). "Judge-made [constitutional and statutory] law is constantly interpreting ambient culture to separate the reasonable from the
unreasonable, the offensive from the inoffensive, the private from the public, and so
forth." Id. at 80.
100. Hernandez, 855 N.E.2d at 34.
101. In the Matter of Alison D., 572 N.E.2d at 33 (Kaye, J., dissenting).
102. In the Matter of Jacob and Dana, 636 N.E.2d 715 (N.Y. 1995); see also supra
note 69.
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